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17. The European Central Bank 
and Financial Supervision 
  
 Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger 
 
 
Financial Stability and the Role of the Central Bank 
 
Stability of the financial sector is important for monetary authorities, 
as monetary and financial sector stability are closely connected. 
History provides many examples where problems in the financial 
sector led to monetary instability. The Great Depression in the US is 
probably the best-known example where bank failures combined with 
an inadequate response by the monetary authorities resulted in a 
prolonged economic crisis. 
What causes instability of the financial sector? The balance sheet 
of banks makes them vulnerable. Banks provide long-term loans, 
which are at least partly funded through deposits, which are generally 
withdrawable on demand. Lack of trust may cause depositors to 
withdraw their money. Apart from this traditional run on a bank, a 
liquidity crisis can also occur due to illiquidity in money or capital 
markets. Doubt about the solvency of a bank may lead to a shift in 
portfolios away from bank liabilities in favour of government 
securities or corporate assets. A massive withdrawal of deposits or a 
shift in portfolios could force a bank to liquidate its loan portfolio on 
unfavourable terms. So, a process that starts as a liquidity crisis could 
lead to a solvency crisis. Furthermore, problems at one bank could 
easily spread towards the rest of the financial system. If various banks 
go bankrupt, the resulting decline in the money supply could lead to a 
serious recession. Deposit insurance and liquidity support by the 
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However, the lender of last resort function of the central bank 
comes at the price of increased moral hazard. A bank may provide 
more risky loans in the knowledge that deposit holders are insured and 
the central bank may come to the rescue. A further problem of deposit 
insurance arises due to adverse selection. The people who are most 
likely to produce the adverse outcome insured against (bank failure) 
are those who most want to take advantage of the insurance. 
Therefore, regulation and supervision are needed. Banking regulation 
generally consists of restrictions on bank assets holdings and capital 
requirements.  
 
Table 17.1 The Role of Central Banks in the European Union in 
Promoting Financial Stability 
 
Source: Update by Eijffinger and De Haan (2000) of Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (1995). 
Country CB responsible for 
financial stability? 
Supervisor 
Austria Yes Ministry of Finance 
Belgium Yes Banking and Finance Commission
Denmark Yes Financial Inspectorate 
Finland Yes Bank Inspectorate/Bank of Finland
France Yes Banque de France/Commission 
Banquaire 
Germany Yes Federal Banking Supervisory 
Office and Deutsche Bundesbank 
Greece Yes Bank of Greece 
Ireland Yes Central Bank of Ireland 
Italy Yes Banca d’Italia 
Luxembourg Yes Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Finance (CSSF) 
Netherlands Yes De Nederlandsche Bank 
Portugal Yes Banco de Portugal 
Spain Yes Banco de España 
Sweden Yes Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority 
UK Yes Financial Services Authority 
EMU No National supervisors 
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In some countries banking supervision is carried out by the central 
bank. In other countries this task is performed by another 
institution(s), sometimes in close co-operation with the central bank 
(see Table 17.1).  
Following the recent adoption by the UK1 and Luxembourg of the 
separation approach, only six EU member countries have the central 
bank as the only authority responsible for banking supervision. 
According to Lannoo (1999) the trend for central banks to retreat from 
supervisory functions can be explained as follows. First, banking is 
becoming an increasingly complex business and less clearly defined. 
Leading banks are active in several jurisdictions as providers of a 
whole series of financial services. Second, linked to this are new 
developments in financial supervision, which increasingly emphasize 
the role of self-regulation and internal risk management in financial 
institutions. Finally, there is increasing acceptance that the 
government, not the central bank, should take responsibility for 
ultimate financial support. This was demonstrated earlier this decade 
in Norway and Sweden, but also more recently in France. In these 
cases there was no alternative but to rely on taxpayer funding, leading 
to more demand for political control of supervisory functions. 
The ECB is not entrusted with any direct responsibility related to 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system.2 These functions are in the remit of the competent 
                                                          
1 In the UK all financial supervisory tasks are now concentrated in the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), including banking supervision (formerly 
belonging to the Bank of England). The FSA has rule-making powers and co-
operates with exchanges and clearing houses. It is accountable to the 
government and parliament. The Bank of England remains responsible for 
ensuring the overall stability of the financial system, which involves 
monitoring and, when necessary, intervening in the market. A mega-
supervisor has certain advantages. There are economies of scale in 
supervision, as well as some practical advantages. There is a one-stop-
shopping for conglomerate financial groups. Expertise is pooled and co-
operation between the different functional supervisors is guaranteed. Still, the 
differences in risk profiles and in the nature of the businesses remain an 
important argument against a mega-supervisor, most importantly for banking 
as compared to the insurance business (Lannoo, 1999). 
2 The Maastricht Treaty establishes however a simplified procedure that 
makes it possible, without amending the Treaty, to entrust specific supervisory 
tasks to the ECB. 
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national authorities. In most EU countries the central bank plays a role 
here, albeit that the supervision is often entrusted to another agency 
(see Table 17.1). Limiting the ECB functions to monetary policy is 
part of a general trend of withdrawal from supervisory functions in 
central banking and fits with the home country control principles of 
the single market. Specific expertise in and knowledge of prudential 
control is situated at the local level, where the bulk of the operations 
of financial institutions are still located (Lannoo, 1999). 
There is no agreement on the role of the central banks in 
supervision (see Padoa-Schioppa, 2003). The ECB (2001) has argued 
in favour of the role of National Central Banks (NCBs) in supervision. 
In this way systemic threats to stability within the euro area can be 
better met. Another possibility is to have a network of single 
supervisory agencies that undertake supervision. As can be seen in 
Table 2, all central banks, except the ECB, are involved in financial 
stability and the majority of NCBs are involved in financial 
supervision.  
 
Trade-Off between Central Bank Involvement and 
Supervision Unification 
 
Masciandaro (2004a) focuses on the trade-off between a central bank 
and a single authority. According to him the centralization versus 
decentralization question in the European context is a second-order 
problem. Solutions will depend on the European national answers 
concerning the optimal design of the financial supervisory framework, 
although it is correctly noted that the European choice does not have 
to be the same one as the national choices. In addition, the choice 
between centralization and decentralization is closely related to the 
choice between a financial single authority model and a multi-
authority model. Furthermore, the centralized-decentralized question 
is less urgent then the national dilemmas. The blurring effect makes it 
urgent for countries to choose a supervisory regime. Instead decisions 
at the European level can be taken after considering data and 
experience is gained. Therefore, Masciandaro analyses the choice 
between a Financial Single Authority model (FSA model) and Multi-
Authority model (MA model). He introduces two indices, namely the 
Financial Authorities’ Concentration index (FAC index) and the 
Central Bank as Financial Authority index (CBFA index). The first 
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index shows that the degree of concentration of supervisory power has 
increased in the developed countries. This result is based on an 
analysis of 69 countries and holds especially for the EU. A higher 
FAC index indicates a higher concentration of supervisory power 
(looking at three sectors: banking, securities markets and insurance). 
The maximum score of the FAC index is 7. When comparing a sample 
of 30 OECD countries, the number of industrialized countries with the 
maximum unification of powers is higher in Europe. The same holds 
for the average level of unification. Table 17.3 gives an overview of 
the FAC index of European countries. When compared to the 2004 
and 2007 accession countries, the EU countries have on average a 
higher degree of concentration of supervisory power.  
 
Table 17.2 Central bank involvement in financial supervision 
 
Countries Central bank Involved in 
financial 
stability 




















National Bank of Austria 
National Bank of Belgium 
Danmarks Nationalbank 
Bank of Finland 
Banque de France 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Bank of Greece 
Central Bank of Ireland 
Banca d’Italia 
Banque Centrale de 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands Bank 
Banco do Portugal 
Banco de España 
Sveriges Riksbank 
Bank of England 




















Partly, banking supervision 
No 
No 
Partly, banking and securities 
Partly, prudential supervision (B,S)
Partly, banking supervision 
Yes, banking supervision 
Yes, financial supervision 
Yes, prudential supervision (B,S) 
 
No 
Yes, prudential supervision (B,S,I) 
Yes, prudential supervision (B,S) 
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Reserve Bank of Australia 
Bank of Canada 
Bank of Japan 










Yes, banking supervision and 
financial holding companies 
 
Source: Schoenmaker (2004), who adapted it from Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (1995), Eijffinger and De Haan (2000) and ECB (2002).  
Notes: B = Banking, S = Securities, I = Insurances. 
 
Table 17.3 Supervisory authorities in EU countries and 2004 and 
2007 accessionc ountries (in 2003) 
 






Rating Weight FAC 
index 
Austria U U U 7 0 7 
Belgium BS BS I 5 0 5 
Bulgaria CB S I 1 0 1 
Cyprus CB S I 1 0 1 
Czech Rep. CB S I 1 0 1 
Denmark U U U 7 0 7 
Estonia U U U 7 0 7 
Finland BS BS I 5 0 5 
France CB, B1, B2, B3 CB, S I 1 -1+1 1 
Germany U U U 7 0 7 
Greece CB S I 1 0 1 
Hungary U U U 7 0 7 
Ireland CB CB CB 7 0 7 
Italy CB CB, S I 1 1 2 
Latvia U U U 7 0 7 
Lithuania CB S I 1 0 1 
Luxembourg BS BS I 5 0 5 
Malta U U U 7 0 7 
Netherlands CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
Poland B B,S I1, I2 1 1-1 1 
Portugal CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
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Table 17.3  continued 
 
Romania CB S I 1 0 1 
Slovak Rep. CB SI SI 3 -1 2 
Slovenia CB S I 1 0 1 
Spain CB,BS(**) CB,S I 1 1-1 1 
Sweden U U U 7 0 7 
Turkey B G I 1 0 1 
UK U U U 7 0 7 
 
Source: Masciandaro (2004a) part of Table 1. 
Notes: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; I = authority 
specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the securities 
markets; U = single authority for all sectors; BS = authority specialized in the 
banking sector and securities markets; BI = authority specialized in the 
banking sector and insurance sector; CB = central bank; SI = authority 
specialized in the insurance sector and securities markets. 
* (b)= banking or central banking law; (s)= security markets law; (i)= 
insurance law. 
** = state or regional agencies. 
FAC index = 7 if there is a single authority for all three sectors, FAC index = 
5 if there is a single authority for the banking sector and securities markets, 
the FAC index is 3 if there is a single authority for the insurance sector and 
the securities markets, or for the insurance sector and the banking sector, the 
FAC index = 1 if there is an independent specialized authority for each sector. 
1 is added there is at least one sector if in the country with two authorities 
assigned to supervise and one of these authorities is also responsible for at 
least one other sector. 1 is subtracted if there is at least one sector in the 
country with two authorities assigned to supervise, but neither of these 
authorities has responsibility for another sector.  
 
The second index measures the involvement of the central bank in 
financial supervision (see Table 17.4). A higher value of the index 
indicates that the central bank has responsibility in more sectors. 
Average central bank involvement is somewhat higher in the 
European industrialized countries when compared to other 
industrialized countries.   
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Table 17.4 CBFA Index and FAC Index in EU Countries and 2004 
and 2007 Accession Countries (in 2002) 
 
Country CBFA index FAC index 
Austria 1 7 
Belgium 1 5 
Bulgaria  2 1 
Cyprus 2 1 
Czech Rep. 2 1 
Denmark 1 7 
Estonia 1 7 
Finland 1 5 
France 3 1 
Germany 1 7 
Greece 2 1 
Hungary 1 7 
Ireland 4 7 
Italy 3 2 
Latvia 1 7 
Lithuania 2 1 
Luxembourg 1 5 
Malta 1 7 
Netherlands 3 2 
Poland 1 1 
Portugal 3 2 
Romania 2 1 
Slovak Rep. 2 2 
Slovenia 2 1 
Spain 3 1 
Sweden 1 7 
Turkey 1 1 
UK 1 7 
 
Source: Masciandaro (2004a) part of Table 2. 
Note: CBFA index = 1 if the central bank has no responsibility in any sector, 
CFBA index = 2 if the central bank has responsibility in one sector, CBFA 
index = 3 if the central bank has responsibility in two sectors and CBFA index 
= 4 if the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors.  
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Central bank involvement in financial supervision is on average 
the highest in developing and emerging countries. Central bank 
involvement is higher in the EU sample than in the sample with the 
European industrialized countries. The accession countries have on 
average a lower level of central bank involvement than the current EU 
member states. Differences in the field of financial supervision 
unification seem to be higher than differences in the degree of central 
bank involvement. 
By using these two indices it is possible to identify each national 
institutional structure. By combining low and high values for the FAC 
and CFBA index four supervisory models can be present. 
Masciandaro (2004a) shows that two models are observed most 
frequently, namely the single financial authority regime (in 19 
countries, including eight EU member states) and the central bank 
dominated multiple supervisor regime (in 41 countries, including six 
EU member states). The first regime concerns countries that have 
weak central bank involvement (low CBFA) and a high level of 
unification of powers (high FAC). The second regime consists of 
countries with high central bank involvement (high CBFA) and a low 
level of unification powers (low FAC). When the EU member states 
and the accession countries (in total 27 countries) are considered 
together, a strong polarization can be seen. There are 12 countries 
with the single financial authority regime, 11 countries with the 
multiple supervisor regime. Exceptions are Ireland with a high degree 
of consolidation and a high level of central bank involvement and 
three remaining countries that have a low degree of consolidation and 
central bank involvement. From this observation it can be concluded 
that there is a trade-off between the involvement of the central bank 
and the unification power. The degree of supervision unification and 
central bank involvement appear to be inversely related. Masciandaro 
gives two explanations for this trade-off. The blurring hazard effect is 
the fear that the function as lender of last resort of the central bank 
might be spread to other institutions if the central bank supervises the 
insurance and securities trading firms. The monopolistic bureau effect 
is the idea that policymakers are afraid that an overly powerful 
bureaucratic agency is created in a country in which the central bank 
involvement in supervision is high and therefore want more 
supervisory agencies. The trade-off between the involvement of the 
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central bank and the unification power is supported by econometric 
analyses of Masciandaro and Porta (2004) and Masciandaro (2004b).  
Masciandaro (2004b) states that it is not possible to define the 
optimal degree of financial supervision a priori. Policymakers who 
decide whether to maintain or reform the supervisory regime calculate 
the expected optimal degree of financial supervision. The dependent 
variable in the analysis of Masciandaro is the supervisory regime with 
one or more authorities. The political delegation process and the 
dynamics of other structural economic and institutional variables are 
expected to influence the dependent variable. The Financial 
Authorities Unification index (FAU index) is a measure of the degree 
of unification of financial supervision powers. This index is exactly 
the same indicator as the FAC index in Masciandaro (2004a). 
Masciandaro (2004b) has tested econometrically with probit and logit 
models the trade-off between the degree of supervision unification and 
the degree of central bank involvement in supervision controlling for a 
number of governance and legal factors. The specification below, 
Equation (1), represents his best outcome of all specifications tested 
by him. 
 





















In this equation MvBdum index (Market vs Bank Index) is a 
qualitative control variable for the private governance factor. The 
financial system model of a given country is expressed by it.3 Mcap 
(market capitalization/GDP) is a quantitative control variable for the 
private governance factor and measures the securities market size 
relative to GDP.4 Goodgov (good governance) is a control variable for 
the public governance factor. The structural capacity of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies can be 
indicated by it and it can represent the control variable for the politics 
                                                          
3 Demigüç-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
4 World Bank (2001), World Development Indicators I, Stock Markets 5.3. 
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and finance view.5 Gnpcapita (gross national product per capita) is a 
control variable for the economic factor and EU membership is a 
control variable for the geographical factor, which indicates whether a 
country is a EU member. The Anglo-Saxon, French, German and 
Scandinavian dummies indicate what the legal root of a given country 
is and therefore it represents the control variables for the law and 
finance view.6 Latitude is a control variable for the institutional factor 
and represents the control variable for the endowment view.7 
Masciandaro (2004b) finds that when the involvement of the 
central bank in supervision increases, the likelihood of greater 
unification in supervision, and therefore the probability of having one 
single financial authority, decreases. This result holds for various 
model specifications and country samples. Masciandaro states that it is 
more likely that there is a Single Authority model if the financial 
system is smaller, the private governance model is more equity 
dominated, and the public governance goodness is higher. In addition 
a relationship between the concentration of powers and the 
institutional framework seems to exist. There is a positive relationship 
between the degree of supervision unification and the German and 
Scandinavian rule of law.  
In Masciandaro and Porta (2003) additional evidence for the 
negative relationship between the central bank involvement in 
supervision and the unification in supervision was found. Masciandaro 












The definitions of the variables FAU, CBFA and MvBdum are the 
same as in the analysis of Masciandaro (2004b). In the above equation 
FD index is a dummy that measures the development of the financial 
                                                          
5 Masciandaro (2004b) constructed the index using all the indicators proposed 
by Kaufmann et al. (2003).  
6 Beck, Demigüç-Kunt and Levine (2002). 
7 Ibid. 
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system of a country.8 The Bank Concentration index is an indicator of 
the degree of banking concentration in a given country and the last 
variable added, Government Market Aversion, in the above equation 
measures the aversion of a government to market policies. The results 
of Masciandaro and Porta (2004), based on a sample of 68 countries, 
show that the probability of getting a single financial authority will be 
higher in the case of lower central bank involvement, a better 
developed financial system, a more market-oriented intermediation 
model, a more concentrated intermediation system and a government 
that supports market policies. In modifying the concentration of 
powers within a country the previous variables should be taken into 
account. When Masciandaro and Porta take a look at the 27 countries 
of the (future) enlarged EU the results indicate that if the CBFA 
dummy is excluded, which was still negative and significant, all other 
variables are not significant any more (although they still have the 
same sign). This result can be explained by looking at the ten EU 
accession countries. Of these countries four have only one financial 
authority, five have minimal involvement of the central bank in both 
financial regulation and supervision. Only two countries have a 
relatively developed financial system and a market-based model of 
intermediation is only present in two accession countries. There is not 
a lot of difference between current EU members and accession 
countries in the degree of involvement of the central bank. Instead 
financial concentration is lower in the accession countries. In addition 
they have a relatively less developed banking system and securities 
market. Furthermore their governments want less market-oriented 
regulatory policies. The only thing that does not support the empirical 
results is the fact that the concentration of intermediaries is slightly 
higher in the accession countries.  
Masciandaro and Porta conclude that there seems to be a reform 
mechanism working. This can be interpreted in an optimistic and 
pessimistic way. The first view states that although market 
development and the adoption of a market-oriented model is not 
present yet, the indicated trend is in line with a strategy of getting 
ahead of the game. Instead the more pessimistic view states that the 
accession countries have chosen too early a model that is not fully in 
line with their current financial structures. Masciandaro and Porta 
                                                          
8 Constructed on the basis of the indices of Demigüç-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
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state that it is of course possible that the model used for the structural 
choices is different from the one they proposed.  
 
Integration of European Financial Markets 
 
De Boissieu (2002) argues that a lot of convergence has occurred 
within the European banking sector but there are some factors 
hindering the achievement of a single market. Examples are the 
divergences in the structure of financing, gaps between countries in 
the field in legislations that are too large, differences in the attitude of 
public decision makers and in the behaviour of private investors. 
Further integration is expected to occur in the form of more banking 
consolidations, cross-border mergers or acquisitions, increased 
banking concentration and increased conglomeration. Therefore, the 
amount of externalities will increase. 
Schoenmaker (2004) first takes a look at the amount of integration 
of the European financial markets. Integration of financial markets is 
pursued because it is expected to lead to economic growth and 
employment creation because of increased efficiency. An indicator for 
financial integration that is often used, are cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions of financial institutions. Walter (2003) gives an overview 
of the value of mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector 
between 1986 and 2000. It is clear from his study that most of the 
financial restructuring in Europe was on an in-sector and domestic 
basis, namely 76 per cent. Only 29 per cent of the total amount of 
mergers and acquisitions in Europe were cross-border intra-European. 
Relatively, most cross-border intra-European mergers were within the 
insurance sector and the banking sector had relatively the least cross-
border intra-European mergers. The question is whether a European 
supervisor is needed before a lot of pan-European mergers occur. 
Schoenmaker (2004) argues that although there are some differences 
between markets, the wholesale markets within the European financial 
system are integrated. In contrast, retail markets are not integrated at 
all. The convergence of consumer lending rates is small and this result 
suggests limited integration in retail markets. Reasons are both 
differences in language, culture, consumer protection rules and 
taxation. The introduction of the Euro and the planned removal of 
legal and regulatory obstacles (Financial Services Action Plan of the 
European Commission) will probably increase the integration in the 
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retail markets. Schoenmaker argues that when cross-border financial 
activity increases, it will become more difficult to supervise the 
financial system at a national level.  
 
Restructuring Financial Supervision in Europe: More 
Centralization and Cross-Sector Integration 
 
In the EU prudential supervision is based on home country control, 
which means that a financial institution is authorized and supervised 
in its home country. Home country control is combined with 
minimum standards and mutual recognition. When a financial 
institution becomes pan-European no additional supervision is needed. 
It is argued by proponents of home country control that the 
effectiveness of supervision is higher when the home country makes a 
group-wide assessment of the risk profile and the capital adequacy of 
a financial institution. In addition, efficiency of supervision is 
increased because financial institutions do not have different 
supervisors. This prevents duplication of effects and regulatory costs. 
Home country supervision authorities are only responsible for 
financial stability in the home country and not in the host countries. In 
case of a failure, home country taxpayers do not want to pay for the 
cross-border spillover effects that this failure has. Cross-border 
spillover effects or externalities will increase with the increased 
integration within the EU. As noted by Schoenmaker (2004) it is 
questionable whether home country control for supervision and host 
country responsibility for financial stability can be maintained. 
Cooperation in the field of crisis management between home and host 
countries might be needed to deal effectively with cross-border 
externalities. Another possibility is centralization of supervision at the 
European level. A disadvantage is the loss of flexibility. This loss of 
flexibility is worse if countries are more asymmetric. A question that 
should be answered is who has to bear the fiscal costs of a possible 
bailout. Prati and Schinasi (1999) state that the ECB should get a 
larger role in crisis management. According to them national 
supervisors are less capable of assessing bank soundness and systemic 
risk adequately when there are more and more pan-European banking 
groups. Prati and Schinasi argue, based on recent experience of the 
Group of Ten Countries, that cooperation between the home and host 
supervisors is not in all cases successful. Vives (2001) highlights the 
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questions of conflict of interest between home and host financial 
supervisors in case of a financial crisis and is in favour of supervision 
at a centralized level such that external effects between countries can 
be internalized properly.  
At the moment the ECB decides whether to solve a general 
liquidity crisis the ECB does not need detailed information of each 
institution in order to make this decision. National central banks 
decide whether to give institutions liquidity support and need detailed 
information in order to decide on this. They need only take care of 
financial stability within their region. This could make them reluctant 
to take into account externalities caused by financial institutions 
within their supervisory region. Schoenmaker (2004) argues that 
whether a centralized system is needed depends on the amount of 
cross-border externalities. These are at the moment limited, because 
(retail) financial institutions are mainly national. He argues that 
therefore the vision to retain supervision at a national level will 
remain popular. Although the amount of cross-border penetration of 
financial institutions is slowly increasing, it is limited. Some pan-
European financial institutions have emerged and they could lead to 
cross-border externalities. If integration is almost completed and there 
are more pan-European (retail) financial institutions, have financial 
supervision at an European level may be needed. According to 
Schoenmaker it is important to cautiously select the rules and 
procedures for how to share the costs of potential bailouts, and how to 
design the political control mechanism for supervision at a European 
level.  
Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2001) made an overview of 
the possible organizational structures of financial supervision. In 
Table 17.5 an overview is given of the main models.  
Separate supervisors exist for banking, insurance and securities in 
the sectoral model. In the functional cross-sector model, ‘twin peak’, 
separate supervisors are present for prudential supervision and the 
conduct of business (two objectives of supervision). In the integrated 
cross-sector model there is one supervisor that combines supervision 
of banking, insurance, securities, prudential and conduct of business 
supervision. Decentralized and with co-operation means that there is 
decision-making by consensus. Instead, if there is co-ordination, 
decisions are made by autonomous national decision-makers based on 
Central Banks and Single Financial Authorities 470 
a rule (e.g. majority voting). In case of centralization, decision making 
on supervisory regulation and policy is done at a European level. 
 
Table 17.5 The Organizational Structure of Financial Supervision: 
Basic Models for Europe 
 
Basic models European 
models 
(cross-border) 










































































system of FSAs 
(EFSA) 
 
Source: Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2001)  
 
The European Central Bank and Financial Supervision  471
European countries differ in the way they have organized financial 
supervision. All basic organizational structure models can be observed 
somewhere. The supervision structure has changed in a lot of 
countries. As can be seen in Table 17.6 the trend is towards cross-
sector supervision. The underlying reason for this is the increased 
amount of financial conglomerates, which makes the division between 
financial sectors more vague. Both the cross-sector functional and 
integrated model have become increasingly popular. 
 
Table 17.6  The Organizational Structure of Financial Supervision: 
National Models in OECD Countries 
 
Basic models Countries 




























Source: Courtis (2002) and ECB (2002), both in Schoenmaker (2004), who 
made his own classification. 
Note: Between brackets the year of establishment of the new cross-sector 
supervisor(s). 
 
There are other arguments both for and against a separation of the 
responsibilities for monetary policy and supervision (see Eijffinger and 
De Haan, 1996). The first argument in favour is the possibility of a 
conflict of interests between both activities. A central bank, responsible 
for supervision of the financial system and, thus, also for failures of 
financial institutions, could be tempted to admit lower (money market) 
interest rates or higher money growth than would be desirable from the 
perspective of price stability, in order to avoid such failures. An 
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example of this argument could be the Federal Reserve System in the 
late 1990s. The Fed was in this period very cautious with raising the 
Federal Funds Rate because of its consequences for the interest rate 
margins and reserves of the US Savings and Loan associations of which 
the balance sheets had deterioriated seriously after the S&L crisis. 
A second argument to separate the authority on financial stability 
from that on monetary stability is the bad publicity usually associated 
with failures or rescue operations. This bad publicity could harm the 
reputation of the central bank in its function as a supervisory agency. A 
loss of reputation may also affect the credibility of monetary policy. 
However, formally having separated responsibilities implies the risks of 
inter-agency conflict, long deliberations and insufficient information 
exchange. This will become problematic when rapid decision-making 
about e.g. liquidity support is needed. An example of this argument is 
the failure of the BCCI bank, at the begining of the 1990s, which was 
the only pan-Arabian bank with its headquarters in London and then, 
thereby, formally under the supervision of the Bank of England. The 
BCCI affair was quite harmful for the reputation of the Bank of England 
and triggered the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 
the UK. 
There are further arguments against a separation of financial 
supervision and the conduct of monetary policy. First, the central bank 
plays a crucial role in the smooth operation of the payments system and 
the associated financial risks. To limit these risks, the central bank 
wishes to supervise and regulate the participants of the payments 
system. Second, the central bank has a function as lender of last resort 
for the financial system and has in that capacity the task to supply 
instantly enough liquidity in the case of liquidity problems or rescue 
operations. Because of its function of lender of last resort, the central 
bank must always be informed by the financial supervisor(s) about 
(potential) crisis in the banking system. 
Various critics have argued that the situation where the ECB puts 
its resources at stake while national supervisors remain responsible for 
supervision, creates a huge potential for inter-agency conflicts 
(Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 1992). National supervisors may have 
interests of their own, like keeping national banks in business. 
Lacking expertise and the time to acquire any, the ECB is likely to 
follow the advice of the national supervisor if a crisis occurs. Led 
astray by possibly biased advice and information, the ECB may then 
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create excess liquidity, thereby perhaps even compromising on its 
primary objective of price stability (Arnold, 1999). 
This reasoning assumes that the ECB will act as lender of last 
resort. Surprisingly enough, no explicit reference is made in the 
Maastricht Treaty to the role of the ECB as a lender of last resort. 
However, the ECB has a responsibility for promoting the smooth 
operation of payment systems, including the provision of financing 
facilities to credit institutions. In this respect there is a potential for the 
ECB to act in the capacity as a lender of last resort as far as the 
provision of short-term liquidity is concerned (OECD, 1998). 
Furthermore, the trend towards greater financial integration will make 
it increasingly difficult to establish national dividing lines. Even when 
a bank problem can be identified as a national one, it may quickly 
become European in scope, warranting action by the central bank. 
Indeed, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) find that, in most banking 
problems in the history of industrial countries, central banks have 
been involved.  
However, in crisis management the creation of central bank money 
is just one category of emergency action. The central bank may not be 
the provider of liquidity assistance. Funds may also come from the 
private sector (i.e. other financial institutions) or from the government 
(i.e. the taxpayers). In the latter case the European Commission will 
be involved in scrutinizing and authorizing such actions, since state 
aid must be compatible with the EU’s competition legislation. 
According to Padoa-Schioppa (1999) the textbook case for emergency 
liquidity assistance to individual institutions has been a rare event over 
the past decades. Furthermore, the emergence of the single euro 
money market lowers banks’ liquidity risk, because the number of 
possible sources of funds is now considerably larger than in the past. 
If a liquidity crisis does occur, the Eurosystem has – at least according 
to Padoa-Schioppa – the necessary capacity to act. 
The lender of last resort function of the ECB requires that it will 
have some monitoring powers as well. This is possible without 
amending the Maastricht Treaty. The case for an European Financial 
Services Authority (EFSA) is based on the underlying tendency 
toward the integration of intermediary and market operations and the 
relief arising from the existence of an independent agency with a well-
defined mission with no conflict between monetary policy and 
banking supervision (see Eijffinger, 2001). Such an EFSA would 
Central Banks and Single Financial Authorities 474 
increase the democratic accountability and transparency of banking 
supervision in Europe. Nevertheless, it would imply a change in the 
Maastricht Treaty. Experiences with the Financial Services Authority 
in the UK and other countries (e.g. Sweden) may serve as a laboratory 
in supervision.  
 
The European Central Bank and Financial Supervision 
 
As a consequence of integration of payment systems and the inter-
bank market within the EMU, systemic risk increased. A close link 
between the European system of financial supervision and the ECB is 
needed in order to ensure financial stability. The ECB has an 
operational and regulatory role in the payment system. Payments 
systems should be safe and efficient in order to get an effective and 
stable functioning financial system. Schoenmaker (2004) states that 
the Eurosystem considers that there should be close co-operation 
between the supervisors of banks and the supervisors of the payment 
system. It would lead to less financial system risk and therefore 
increased stability.  
In the Maastricht Treaty there is a separation between 
the task of monetary policy and the task of financial 
supervision and stability, although there is a relationship 
between oversight on the payment system and some 
broader functions of why financial supervision and 
stability are necessary. According to Schoenmaker could 
be given the ECB a financial supervision task, if it is 
thought to be desirable. A treaty basis is needed in order to 
create a European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS). Provisions that are linked to the ECB could be 
amended. The independence of the monetary function 
should be kept and a cross-sector supervisor function with 
political accountability could be defined.  
The Lamfalussy approach stimulates the convergence of 
supervisory practices. Differences in supervision that remain will 
occur because of differences in financial structures between countries. 
After convergence has taken place there will be more similar policy 
(supervisory standards based on best practices) and this gives the EU a 
more level playing-field (EFC, 2002). The system of financial 
supervision will become more efficient. In addition, centralization will 
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be more desirable because the costs in terms of lost flexibility will be 
lower.  
Centralization at a European level may be desirable if the number 
of cross-border externalities increases. Schoenmaker mentions the 
ESFS, which could co-operate with the national supervisors. This does 
not mean that all supervision has to be done at a centralized level. 
Home countries can still have the task of small and medium-sized 
financial institutions supervision. In many cases field inspections are 
performed and this is best done at the local level. Instead the 
supervision of large pan-European financial institutions could be 
centralized. The policy framework (the reporting requirements, the 
rule book, the reporting format and computer systems) could be made 
uniform as well. In order to make local supervisors adhere to this 
framework one could design the appropriate decision-making and 
incentive mechanism. In addition, pooling of information could be 
helpful in decreasing systemic risk. Schoenmaker argues that the fiscal 
costs of possible bail-outs should still be at a national level, because 
there is no European budget available. He concludes that supervision 
of financial institutions will become a combination of national and 
European characteristics.  
De Boissieu (2003) is in favour of making the implementation of 
the lender of last resort function clearer. He pleads for subsidiarity as 
the main basic principle of banking supervision within the European 
Union. He distinguishes three forms of supervision systems, namely 
the central bank model, the dual model and the FSA model. In the first 
supervision structure, banking supervision is in the hands of CB or a 
committee/commission that is highly dependent on the CB. In the dual 
model, the Ministry of finance or a commission that is attached to it or 
an independent committee takes care of the banking supervision. The 
central bank gives technical assistance. In this dual model a high 
degree of cooperation between the supervisors is present. The last 
model is the FSA model. In this model an independent organization 
monitors all banking and financial activities. He states that although 
the last model gets more attention, institutional convergence within 
the European Union is only small. It is argued that subsidiarity should 
be kept as a rule because local/national authorities keep their 
comparative information advantage. They are still better in gathering 
local information and monitoring domestic banks. They are better able 
to implement pillar one and two of Basel II. De Boissieu argues that 
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for several reasons more coordination in the field of banking 
supervision and financial stability is needed. First of all, the increased 
number of financial conglomerates, the integration of capital markets 
and the increase in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the banking 
and insurance sector lead to more spill-over effects. Although 
coordination in banking supervision has increased, it has not increased 
enough. Multilateral supervision cooperation occurs mostly in the 
field of macro-prudential supervision and coordination of micro-
prudential supervision occurs mainly in a bilateral manner.  
Second, De Boissieu says that fully decoupling prudential policy 
from monetary policy is not possible. He states that the optimal 
amount of centralization and coordination can differ between 
supervision of financial institutions and lender of last resort 
interventions. In the first case local information is important. In case 
of the lender of last resort more centralization is important because 
during systemic crisis externalities are increasing a lot. In addition 
quick intervention is needed and local information is less decisive for 
these operations.  
Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) argue that banking supervision 
should be done by an agency that is separate from the central bank. 
They state that functional separation is desirable. OECD countries are 
divided into countries where the central bank is a monopolist in 
banking supervision and countries in which this is not the case. The 
latter countries have lower inflation rates and less volatile inflation 
rates. Banks supervised by the central bank are more profitable but 
face larger staff costs and issue less bonds. This could indicate lower 
efficiency. Although the data that was used by them was not 
definitively in favour of a separation of the supervision agency and the 
central bank some reasons are mentioned why separation should 
occur. The reasons mentioned are: the evolution of financial 
intermediaries, moral hazard problems, and cost accountability. 
Separation could make more transparent who is paying for monetary 
policy and who is paying for banking supervision. Di Noia and Di 
Giorgio favour also an independent ESFS structure. This supervision 
structure should be similar to the structure of the ESCB. This means 
that national agencies in EU member countries should participate 
actively. They want two European financial regulation agencies, 
which are formally separated from the ECB. The first agency would 
be responsible for the stability of all intermediaries and the second 
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agency would be responsible for transparency and disclosure 
requirements. They believe that comprehensive coordination of 
legislation and execution of regulation in financial markets could be 
achieved in this way. They propose to place both agencies at the 
centre of the ESFS.  
Walter (2001), however, argues in favour of a single European 
regulator, an EFSA. He thinks that it is unavoidable if one wants an 
integrated single financial market within Europe. He states that 
financial markets are integrated enough to have one regulator. The 
single European agency should not be bureaucratic and supervise 
every institution. He supports the idea of a federal structure, like the 
European System of Central Banks (ECB and NCBs). The EFSA 
should be in the centre of the European System of Financial 
Regulators. Tasks of the EFSA would include harmonization and co-
ordination of financial regulation and the design of common principles 
and guidelines. In addition the EFSA should check whether the rules 
are implemented consistently across all European countries. Another 
task of the EFSA could be the monitoring of large pan-European 
banking groups. Walter wants a separation between the EFSA and the 
ECB because they have conflicting interests, clearly defined mandates 
are needed and basic democratic principles have to be satisfied. He 
argues that cooperation between the EFSA and the ECB and national 
central banks is desirable and states that the model used in Germany is 
a good role model for Europe. 
Vives (2001) analyses the restructuring of financial regulation in 
the EMU. He states that a financial supervision system in which NCBs 
are responsible for financial stability could lead to some problems. 
First of all, there would be a conflict in interest when a transnational 
crisis occurs. National supervisors will only take into account the 
effects of a crisis on the financial stability in their own country and 
neglect the adverse effects the crisis could have on other countries. 
Second, national authorities could execute too much intervention 
because they would listen more to domestic interest groups that see 
some institutions as too big to fail. Too much intervention would take 
place as well if the costs of intervention are distributed over the whole 
EU. This happens in cases of concern of general financial stability 
within the EU. Third, there are some regulatory jurisdiction problems. 
The question is: who wants to bail out financial institutions that are 
located in more than one European country because not all the 
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benefits of a bailout go to one country? The fourth problem mentioned 
by him is the fact that a national supervisor is not able to provide 
sufficient help in case of a crisis, because of contagion to other 
countries that can take place. The last problem is a fiscal issue. It is 
not clear how high the rescue amount has to be and how the payment 
and losses have to be divided across countries. Some arguments can 
be put forward to give the central bank supervision tasks. The central 
bank can distinguish whether a problem is a problem of liquidity or of 
solvency and this minimizes the losses that occur with loans granted. 
The central bank could be a crisis manager and determine what the 
best kind of intervention is. In addition it can have economies of scope 
in information gathering by combining the tasks of providing liquidity 
and supervision. More banking supervisory information within the 
ECB could improve the accuracy of the macroeconomic forecasts. 
Vives (2001) argues that the only institution that can guarantee 
stability is the ECB. Coordination in case of crisis situations is not 
enough. Instead quick centralized interventions should be taken. In 
addition he suggests that the ECB should publish the formal 
framework of crisis resolution. It should be made transparent in which 
cases the NCBs need to intervene and in which cases this task is for 
the ECB. He points out that the ECB should perform some monitoring 
tasks as well. It should get the power to access and gather supervisory 
information. As a consequence costs in communication and negation 
will decrease and the exchange of information could be facilitated. 
Amendment of the Maastricht Treaty is not needed to achieve this. It 
is important to have a procedure that describes how losses in case of 
lender of last resort activities are divided between countries. The 
Ecofin could be consulted when such operations are needed. The costs 
of bargaining ex post are reduced when the crisis procedures are clear 
and in case of a crisis situation fast intervention is possible. Vives 
(2001) states that cooperation is not enough in case of an integrated 
European market. A centralized supervisor is needed and could lead to 
even further integration of European markets. The establishment of an 
independent EFSA that has authority over banking, insurance and 
securities would have some advantages. First, it might better resist the 
local pressure to assist particular institutions. Second, accountability 
would be facilitated because the ECB and the ESFA have clear 
missions. This prevents the conflict between monetary policy and 
supervision. Third, it would prevent an increase in the power of the 
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ECB and would let the ECB remain its credibility in monetary policy. 
Vives argued in 2001 that an ESFA was not yet desirable because 
there was not enough political integration within Europe. The ESFA 
would therefore face the same accountability problems that the ECB 
faces because a well-defined political principle is missing.  
 
Conclusion: Towards a European Financial Services 
Authority 
 
Based on the previous analysis, I personally think that in the long run 
the best system for European financial supervision will be a European 
Financial Services Authority (see also Eijffinger, 2001). There will be 
a tendency to more integrated supervision because of the long-run 
trend to financial conglomerates in Europe. Next to that there will also 
be a development towards more cross-border supervision depending 
on the pace of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The cross-
border externalities between EU financial institutions and markets will 
become increasingly important. This means that there will be in the 
long run a federally organized financial supervision structure with the 
EFSA at the centre in which national supervisors (NCBs and national 
FSAs) still have supervision tasks. Like the ESCB, it will have all the 
characteristics of a “hub and spokes” system. Of course, quite crucial 
will be the decision about the degree of centralization of financial 
supervision. When the degree of centralization is high, we could speak 
of a “strong” EFSA. Instead, when the degree of centralization is low, 
the EFSA is said to be “weak”. In both systems the ECB has an 
important role to play because of its responsibility for financial 
stability in general and its function of lender of last resort in 
particular. The difference between the “weak” and “strong” EFSA will 
also determine the relative influence of the ECB, which will be higher 
in case of a "strong" EFSA (high degree of centralization). Financial 
supervisors and academics see these tendencies very well, but it is up 
to the political authorities to take timely steps in this direction. It 
would be good news if the EU political authorities (Ecofin, European 
Commission and European Parliament) would open a serious debate 
on whether and how European financial supervision should be 
concentrated with a newly established EFSA and what the future role 
of the ECB should be in this respect. I fear, however, that we need a 
major European financial crisis (e.g. a serious bank failure in France, 
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Germany or Italy) before the political authorities would become aware 
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